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Prerogative, Parliament, and Creative 
Constitutional Adjudication: Reflections on Miller 
 
James Grant 
 
 
I. MILLER’S CHOICE 
 
If the Supreme Court’s decision in R (Miller and Dos Santos) v 
Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union had gone the other 
way, the decision to withdraw from the European Union would have 
been a decision neither for voters in a referendum nor necessarily for 
Parliament, but for Her Majesty’s Government in the exercise of the 
royal prerogative.1 That conclusion, supported by the three dissenting 
Justices of the Supreme Court, may have surprised many people. But 
it would not have been contrary to any requirements of the United 
Kingdom’s constitution. Despite what all the judges who heard the 
case seem to have thought, constitutional law was silent on the 
question, until the majority in the Supreme Court made parliamentary 
authorisation a requirement. That does not, of course, entail that the 
majority was wrong to do so. But it does entail that the majority’s 
judgment was not, as they claimed, merely an orthodox application of 
established constitutional law. The Supreme Court had a choice. 
The legal challenge to the government’s authority to trigger 
Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union, the first step in the 
process of leaving the EU, has been widely described as ‘the 
constitutional case of the century’.2 It is easy to get carried away, but 
                                                     
 Lecturer in Law, King’s College London. Email: james.grant@kcl.ac.uk. I am 
grateful to Paul Craig and Fergal Davis for helpful comments on a previous draft, 
and to my students at King’s for stimulating discussions on the topic of this article. 
The usual disclaimer applies. 
1 R (Miller and Dos Santos) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union 
[2017] UKSC 5. All paragraph references are to the majority’s judgment unless 
otherwise stated. Lord Neuberger PSC, Lady Hale DPSC, and Lords Mance, Kerr, 
Clarke, Wilson, Sumption, and Hodge constituted the majority. Lords Reed, 
Carnwath, and Hughes dissented.  
2 See eg ‘Brexit in the Supreme Court’ (The Constitution Unit, UCL, 30 January 
2017) <https://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/constitution-unit-events/brexit-in-
supreme-court> accessed 27 February 2017. 
 
 
 
 
Reflections on Miller 2 
certainly the media’s interest in the case was unlike anything that had 
been seen before in the UK. After the Divisional Court held that the 
government needed parliamentary authorisation to trigger Article 50,3 
the three judges who decided the case faced visceral attacks from some 
people who thought the decision to withdraw had already been made 
in the referendum. Grossly misleading newspaper articles in the Daily 
Express and the Daily Mail among others, which had campaigned for 
the UK to leave the EU (‘Brexit’), described the judges as having 
‘blocked Brexit’ and, chillingly, as ‘enemies of the people’.4 
Troubled by this misunderstanding of the case, Lord 
Neuberger of Abbotsbury, the President of the Supreme Court, opened 
the hearing of the government’s appeal, which was broadcast live on 
the BBC News and Sky News channels, with a statement designed in 
part to depoliticise the case. ‘The Supreme Court exists to decide 
points of law which fall within its jurisdiction,’ Lord Neuberger 
reassured the audience. ‘This appeal is concerned with legal issues, 
and as judges, our duty is to consider those issues impartially and to 
decide the case according to the law. That is what we will do.’5 The 
Divisional Court had made the same point at the beginning of its 
judgment: ‘It deserves emphasis at the outset that the court in these 
proceedings is only dealing with a pure question of law.’6 
But deciding questions of law is not all that judges do in 
fulfilling their judicial role. Or more precisely, at least in common law 
systems such as the UK’s, judges do not merely have a duty to interpret 
and apply the law. They also have a power to develop and change the 
law, a power which arises most uncontroversially when the law does 
not fully determine the court’s decision. This indeterminacy in the law 
does not arise because there is disagreement about what the law 
requires. Disagreement about the law, far from entailing that there is 
no legally right answer, presupposes that there is a legally right 
                                                     
3 R (Miller and Dos Santos) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union 
[2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin). 
4 ‘We Must Get Out of the EU’ (Daily Express, 4 November 2016); ‘Enemies of the 
People’ (Daily Mail, 4 November 2016); see also ‘The Judges versus the People’ 
(Daily Telegraph, 4 November 2016). 
5 UK Supreme Court, Transcript of Hearing 5 December 2016 pages 3–4 
<https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/draft-transcript-monday-161205.pdf> 
accessed 27 February 2017.  
6 Miller (n 3) [5] (Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd CJ, Sir Terence Etherton MR, Sales 
LJ). 
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answer. In disagreeing about what the right answer is we presuppose 
that there is a right answer worth disagreeing about. However, 
sometimes our reasoning drives us to the conclusion that there is no 
uniquely right answer.7 When the law runs out in this sense, it leaves 
a gap in which the court must choose between competing decisions, 
each of which is legally permissible but not required. In such cases, 
the court does not merely apply the law, but develops it, changing the 
law by making it more determinate—a development which requires 
the court to consider principles from outside the law. 
In the Miller case, the Supreme Court was faced with a 
question on which the constitutional requirements were indeterminate, 
which entailed a choice between constitutionally permissible 
decisions. Yet that is not how the Supreme Court viewed the matter. 
Sitting for the first time en banc, the Supreme Court held, by a 
majority of eight to three, that the established requirements of the 
constitution did not give the government authority to trigger the 
process of leaving the EU without an Act of Parliament conferring that 
authority. On a secondary issue, the Supreme Court unanimously held 
that the consent of the devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales, and 
Northern Ireland was not legally required before starting the process 
of leaving the EU, and that it was not open to the Court to develop the 
law to make it a legal requirement. 
In my view, the majority’s reasoning does not support their 
conclusion on the first issue. But that is not to say that their conclusion 
cannot be justified on other grounds. As far as the legal grounds are 
concerned, the minority, and especially Lord Reed, convincingly 
explained that there were no existing legal requirements prohibiting 
the Crown from deciding to withdraw from the EU and notifying the 
European Council of that intention. But arguably the minority paid 
insufficient attention to the question of whether the court should have 
developed the law in a way that supports the majority’s conclusion. 
Perhaps that is because the majority gave no cogent reason for such a 
development, believing they had found a right answer in the existing 
law. The majority’s conclusion can be justified only if it would have 
been morally and politically illegitimate for the executive, which is 
accountable to Parliament, to have the power to decide to withdraw 
from the EU without express parliamentary authorisation. As we shall 
                                                     
7 See HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (first published 1961, 3rd edn, Clarendon Press 
2012) 131–32; Joseph Raz, ‘Legal Reasons, Sources and Gaps’ in his The Authority 
of Law (OUP 1979) 70. 
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see, defending that conclusion is more difficult than the majority 
assumed. 
 
 
II. THE MAIN ISSUE IN MILLER 
 
The main issue for the Supreme Court in Miller was whether the royal 
prerogative provided the government with the authority to start the 
process of withdrawing from the EU. Counsel for the claimants argued 
that the prerogative did not extend to withdrawing from the EU, and 
so it was not necessary to show that Parliament had expressly 
prohibited a power that does not exist; rather, the government needed 
to show that Parliament had conferred a statutory power, which it had 
not. Counsel for the Secretary of State conceded that Parliament had 
not conferred a statutory power, but argued that the foreign affairs 
prerogative did include the power to withdraw from the EU, and that 
Parliament had done nothing to take that power away. The 
disagreement, therefore, was centrally about the scope of the foreign 
affairs prerogative, and whether it extended to the decision to 
withdraw from the EU. 
Some commentators, however, have doubted whether the 
government was right to concede that the government lacked a 
statutory power to withdraw from the EU. They make the surprising 
claim that the power to withdraw under Article 50 of the Treaty on 
European Union, as introduced by the Lisbon Treaty signed on 13 
December 2007, has been incorporated into domestic law by the 
European Communities Act 1972, as amended,8 and that Parliament 
                                                     
8 European Union (Amendment) Act 2008, adding the Treaty on European Union, 
which contains Article 50, to the list of Treaties in the European Communities Act 
1972 Act, s 1. 
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had therefore already conferred a statutory power to withdraw.9 It is 
worth setting out the relevant wording of Article 50:10 
 
1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from 
the Union in accordance with its own constitutional 
requirements. 
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall 
notify the European Council of its intention. … 
 
The claim that Article 50 has direct effect in domestic law depends on 
section 2(1) of the 1972 Act, which states that: 
 
All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and 
restrictions from time to time created or arising by or 
under the Treaties, and all such remedies and 
procedures from time to time provided for by or under 
the Treaties, as in accordance with the Treaties are 
without further enactment to be given legal effect or 
used in the United Kingdom shall be recognised and 
available in law, and be enforced, allowed and 
followed accordingly … 
 
It is claimed that, by adding the Lisbon Treaty to the list of Treaties to 
which this section applies, Parliament had already provided statutory 
authorisation for the government to decide to withdraw from the EU, 
and any prerogative power to withdraw went into abeyance. 
Proponents of this view, while conceding that Article 50 does not state 
which institution of the Member State has the power to decide to 
withdraw, seem to be content merely to insist that, under the UK’s 
                                                     
9 For proponents of this argument, see Robert Craig, ‘Casting Aside Clanking 
Medieval Chains: Prerogative, Statute and Article 50 after the EU Referendum’ 
(2016) 79 Modern Law Review 1019; KD Ewing, ‘Editor’s Introduction’ (2016) 27 
King’s Law Journal 289, 291–92. For a different but related argument that section 
2(2) of the 1972 Act provides a statutory basis for the power to trigger Article 50, 
see Adam Tucker, ‘Triggering Brexit: A Decision for the Government, but under 
Parliamentary Scrutiny’ (UK Constitutional Law Blog, 29 June 2016) 
<https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/06/29/adam-tucker-triggering-brexit-a-
decision-for-the-government-but-under-parliamentary-scrutiny/> accessed 27 
February 2017. 
10 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2012] OJ C326/13, art 
50. The Treaty came into force on 1 December 2009. 
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constitutional arrangements, ‘[f]oreign affairs is … by definition 
carried out by the Executive’.11 
This argument is flawed for at least two main reasons. First, as 
the majority in the Supreme Court pointed out, Article 50 ‘operates 
only on the international plane’—that is, it is not (as section 2(1) puts 
it) ‘to be given legal effect or used in the United Kingdom’—and so 
‘is not therefore brought into UK law through section 2 of the 1972 
Act’.12 Secondly, even if it were applicable in domestic law, Article 
50 refers to a Member State’s own constitutional requirements—that 
is, its existing requirements—and leaves those requirements 
unchanged. It leaves unanswered the question: under the Member 
State’s constitution, who is permitted or required to make the decision 
to withdraw from the EU? In the UK, the executive has the power to 
conduct foreign affairs, but the question—which is not answered by 
Article 50, even if it had been brought into domestic law (which it had 
not)—is whether there are any constitutional requirements that limit 
this power, such that it does not extend to the decision to withdraw 
from the EU.  
So the question is about of the foreign affairs prerogative. 
Under that prerogative, the government may, among other things, 
‘negotiate, conclude, construe, observe, breach, repudiate or terminate 
a treaty.’13 The effect of this power is that the Crown can ‘irrevocably 
bind the nation’.14 That is, the treaty will ‘bind the nation’—or, more 
accurately, the state—under international law, but it will not give rise 
to any rights and duties in domestic law, until it is incorporated into 
domestic law by an Act of Parliament. This is the dualist approach: the 
executive can create legal obligations on the international plane, but 
only an Act of Parliament can incorporate those international 
obligations into domestic law. The corollary, in this simplified picture, 
is that the executive can extinguish international legal obligations, but 
only an Act of Parliament can extinguish the obligations that have 
been incorporated into domestic law. 
                                                     
11 Craig (n 9) 1048. 
12 Miller (n 1) [104]; see also [79] and [105]. See also Gavin Phillipson, ‘A Dive into 
Deep Constitutional Waters: Article 50, the Prerogative and Parliament’ (2016) 79 
Modern Law Review 1064, 1070–76. 
13 JH Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry [1990] 2 AC 
418, 476 (Lord Templeman). 
14 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon Press 
1765) 244. 
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The central question in Miller was: do the special features of 
EU law—which gives rise to ‘directly effective’ rights enforceable in 
the domestic courts (what the 1972 Act calls ‘enforceable EU 
rights’)—affect the scope of the government’s prerogative power in 
relation to EU treaties, with the result that the prerogative does not 
include the power to withdraw from those treaties? The majority 
answered this question in the affirmative. It did not go quite so far as 
to say that the prerogative power could not be used to change EU law, 
and hence to change enforceable EU rights under the 1972 Act. 
Instead, the majority drew a distinction between the prerogative power 
to contribute to the process of changing EU law (which the majority 
‘readily accept[ed]’ exists) and the prerogative power to withdraw 
from the EU (which the majority held does not exist).15 The majority’s 
distinction raises two questions: Was it required by an application of 
existing constitutional law? If not, was majority right to develop 
constitutional law to make it a requirement?  
 
 
III. PRECEDENT AND THE PREROGATIVE 
 
The majority in Miller presented their judgment as an application of 
constitutional law expounded during the developments of the 
seventeenth century. In the Case of Proclamations, Sir Edward Coke 
told King James I that ‘the king by his proclamation or other ways 
cannot change any part of the common law, or statute, or the customs 
of the realm.’16 It would be an exaggeration to say that, after this case, 
the courts always backed Parliament when asked to adjudicate on the 
balance of power between the Crown and Parliament.17 As Coke 
himself told the House of Commons in 1628, ‘in a doubtful thing, 
interpretation goes always for the king.’18 Ultimately, the Crown’s 
powers were curbed not primarily by the courts, but by 
                                                     
15 Miller (n 1) [95]. 
16 Case of Proclamations (1611) 12 Co Rep 74, 75. 
17 For a significant instance of the courts backing the Crown over Parliament, see R 
v Hampden (1637) 3 St Tr 825, discussed in DL Keir, ‘The Case of Ship-Money’ 
(1936) 52 Law Quarterly Review 546. 
18 Quoted in Margaret A Judson, The Crisis of the Constitution: An Essay in 
Constitutional and Political Thought in England, 1603–1645 (Rutgers University 
Press 1949) 264. 
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parliamentarians, and by civil war and revolution.19 But Coke’s 
judgment in the Case of Proclamations was a significant judicial 
rebuke to the Crown, and the requirement that prerogative powers 
cannot ‘alter the law of the land’,20 reaffirmed in Article 1 of the Bill 
of Rights 1689,21 is undoubtedly an important rule of constitutional 
law and was common ground among the parties in Miller.  
The rule that there is no prerogative power to alter the law of 
the land does not entail that the prerogative cannot alter legal rights 
and duties under the law of the land. Indeed, one of the twentieth 
century’s leading public lawyers, Sir William Wade, went so far as to 
say that the prerogative power should be defined as a legal power ‘to 
alter people’s rights, duties or status under the laws of this country 
which the courts of this country enforce.’22 That may have been too 
broad, but Supreme Court in Miller acknowledged that the prerogative 
power could at least change people’s legal rights in some 
circumstances—for example, the Crown’s power to alter civil 
servants’ terms of service—but the majority was keen to stress that, 
when there is a prerogative power to change legal rights, ‘it does not 
change the law, because the law has always authorised the exercise of 
the power.’23 The law does not authorise the exercise of the treaty-
making power to alter people’s rights and duties under domestic law.24 
Under the dualist approach, as already mentioned, while treaties are 
not without legal effect—for even unincorporated treaties are used as 
                                                     
19 See Adam Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (Hart Publishing 2005) 69–87. 
See also Paul Craig, ‘Prerogative, Precedent and Power’ in Christopher Forsyth and 
Ivan Hare (eds), The Golden Metwand and the Crooked Cord: Essays on Public Law 
in Honour of Sir William Wade (Clarendon Press 1998). 
20 ibid. See also The Zamora [1916] 2 AC 77 (PC), 90 (Lord Parker of Waddington). 
21 Bill of Rights 1689, art 1: ‘the pretended power of suspending of laws or the 
execution of laws by regall authority without consent of Parliament is illegall’. 
22 HWR Wade, Constitutional Fundamentals (Stevens & Sons 1980) 46. 
23 Miller (n 1) [52]. 
24 It was for this reason that Wade doubted whether the treaty-making power is a 
prerogative power: see Wade (n 22) 47, arguing that treaty-making is ‘merely a piece 
of administrative action on the international plane’, and that it ‘is not an act of power 
in any British constitutional sense, since it involves no special power that a British 
court will recognise.’ See also HWR Wade, ‘Procedure and Prerogative in Public 
Law’ (1985) 101 Law Quarterly Review 180, 193: ‘the treaty-making power is surely 
a non-prerogative, since the making of a treaty, by itself, cannot alter the law of the 
land.’ 
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an aid to statutory interpretation—they do not directly affect legal 
rights and duties until incorporated by an Act of Parliament. 
But EU law has a special status. The UK joined a ‘new legal 
order’ in 1973, and by virtue of the 1972 Act, EU law became what 
the majority in Miller described as ‘an entirely new, independent and 
overriding source of domestic law.’25 Are enforceable EU rights, 
derived from this new source of law, among the laws of the land that 
cannot be altered by the prerogative? Or does the law allow a 
prerogative power to alter enforceable EU rights? Recalling Lord 
Diplock’s remark that it is ‘350 years and a civil war too late for the 
Queen’s courts to broaden the prerogative’,26 you might be tempted to 
conclude—as the Divisional Court in Miller concluded—that the 
prerogative cannot be extended to empower the government to change 
enforceable EU rights. 
Yet Diplock’s remark was too simplistic.27 The prerogative is 
not fixed. Its scope is indeterminate.28 Coke, in a less-frequently 
quoted passage in the Case of Proclamations, said: 
 
[T]rue it is that every precedent hath a commencement; 
but where authority and precedent is wanting there is 
need of great consideration before that anything of 
novelty be established, and to provide that this be not 
against the law of the land.29 
 
The novelty of the EU legal order is no reason to deny that the law 
allows a prerogative power to change enforceable EU rights. In any 
case, the majority does not deny this point. Instead, the majority 
                                                     
25 Miller (n 1) [82]. cf John Forman, ‘The European Communities Act 1972: The 
Government’s Position on the Meaning and Effect of Its Constitutional Provisions’ 
(1973) 10 Common Market Law Review 39, 43: ‘The words of the [1972] Act are … 
consistent with the independent nature of the Community Legal Order, i.e. 
Community Law is regarded as law to be applied in the United Kingdom, and not as 
United Kingdom law.’ 
26 British Broadcasting Corporation v Johns [1965] Ch 32, 79 (Diplock LJ). 
27 cf R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte Lain [1967] 2 QB 864, 
886 (Diplock LJ). 
28 See FW Maitland, The Constitutional History of England (CUP 1908) 418; 
Sebastian Payne, ‘The Royal Prerogative’ in Maurice Sunkin and Sebastian Payne 
(eds), The Nature of the Crown: A Legal and Political Analysis (Clarendon Press 
1999) 101–2. 
29 Case of Proclamations (n 16) 75 (Coke CJ). 
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sought to distinguish between changing EU law and withdrawing from 
the EU,30 a distinction to which we shall return. 
The majority’s judgment would follow inexorably from 
established principles of constitutional law if a prerogative power to 
alter or withdraw from EU law were incompatible with statute law. 
The case of Attorney General v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel Ltd 
established that: 
 
[W]hen the Act deals with something which before the 
Act could be effected by the prerogative, and 
specifically empowers the Crown to do the same thing, 
but subject to conditions, the Crown assents to that, and 
by that Act, to the prerogative being curtailed.31  
 
This principle was extended further in Laker Airways Ltd v 
Department of Trade, which concerned the Crown’s treaty-making 
powers and provides the most promising basis for the Miller 
claimants’ central proposition.32 In 1972, Laker Airways wished to 
operate a transatlantic service between London and New York. To do 
so, it was required to fulfil two conditions: first, it had to obtain a 
licence under the Civil Aviation Act 1971; secondly, it had to be 
approved by both the United States and the United Kingdom 
governments, under a 1946 treaty known as the Bermuda Agreement. 
Laker Airways was granted a licence by the Civil Aviation Authority, 
and was awaiting designation under the Bermuda Agreement, when a 
newly elected Labour government sought to use its prerogative power 
to cancel the airline’s landing rights under the Bermuda Agreement. 
The case did not fall within the De Keyser’s principle, because the 
statutory scheme for granting licences was meant to be used in 
conjunction with the prerogative power to obtain landing rights from 
the United States. However, the Court of Appeal in Laker Airways 
held that the government could not use its prerogative so as to deprive 
                                                     
30 Miller (n 1) [78] and [95]. That said, rather inconsistently with these remarks, 
however, the majority also said that ‘the Divisional Court was right to hold that 
changes in domestic rights acquired through that source [the EU Treaties] … 
represent another, albeit related, ground for justifying that conclusion.’ 
31 Attorney General v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel Ltd [1920] AC 508, 526 (Lord 
Dunedin). 
32 Laker Airways Ltd v Department of Trade [1977] QB 643 (CA). 
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Laker Airways ‘of the protection which the statute affords them.’33 
Given that the 1971 Act did not empower the Secretary of State to 
revoke the licence except in circumstances falling within section 4 of 
that Act (which did not apply in that case), he could not deprive the 
airline of the use of its licence by other means, namely the 
prerogative.34 This principle can be generalised: the law does not allow 
the prerogative to frustrate a statute, and—significantly—this 
principle has been taken to apply even when the relevant statutory 
provisions have not been brought into force.35 Whether a prerogative 
power would frustrate a statute is essentially a question of statutory 
interpretation. 
The Miller case does not fall within either the De Keyser’s 
principle or the Laker Airways principle. Most obviously, the 1972 Act 
did not empower the Crown to withdraw from the EU subject to 
conditions. Nor, as I shall explain in the next two sections, would 
withdrawing from the EU frustrate the 1972 Act or any other 
legislation. As Paul Craig says, the Miller case does not so much 
extend as ‘radically change’ the De Keyser’s principle.36 The central 
proposition defended by the claimants in Miller was that there can be 
no prerogative power to alter or withdraw from a treaty if to do so 
would affect rights that had been incorporated into domestic law. 
‘There is,’ Craig rightly points out, ‘no case that comes close to 
establishing this proposition.’37 
The Divisional Court had previously considered and rejected a 
very similar proposition. In R v Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, ex party Rees-Mogg, the applicant, a former 
editor of The Times, sought a declaration that it would be unlawful for 
the Crown to ratify the Treaty on European Union, signed in 
Maastricht on 7 February 1992.38 Like Miller, this challenge received 
much media attention, and was described by the applicant as the most 
                                                     
33 ibid 707 (Lord Denning MR). 
34 ibid 707 (Lord Denning MR), 722 (Roskill LJ), 728 (Lawton LJ). 
35 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Fire Brigades Union 
[1995] 2 AC 513. 
36 Paul Craig, ‘Brexit: A Drama in Six Acts’ (2016) 41 European Law Review 447, 
463. 
37 ibid 463. See, however, Paul Craig, ‘Miller, Structural Constitutional Review, and 
the Limits of Prerogative Power’ (forthcoming). 
38 R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Rees-
Mogg [1994] QB 552. 
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important constitutional case for three centuries.39 Lord Rees-Mogg’s 
counsel, David Pannick QC, now also a peer, argued that the Crown’s 
prerogative power to conclude treaties could not be used to change EU 
law, because that had been given effect in domestic law through the 
1972 Act. 
The Divisional Court in Rees-Mogg rejected that argument. As 
we shall see, the 1972 Act, and subsequent legislation to ‘make 
provision consequential on’ EU treaties,40 reflected the traditional 
dualist approach and Parliament’s limited role. Thus, as Richard 
Rawlings noted shortly after the Rees-Mogg judgment, any legal 
challenge to these ‘orthodox views of constitutional requirement is 
immediately confronted with the difficult task of throwing over a 
whole legal framework incorporating and founded upon those 
views.’41 For this reason, Lloyd LJ, giving the judgment of the 
Divisional Court, ruled that the 1972 Act did not fetter the prerogative 
power ‘to alter or add to the EEC Treaty’: 
 
When Parliament wishes to fetter the Crown’s treaty-
making power in relation to Community law, it does so 
in express terms, such as one finds in section 6 of the 
Act of 1978. Indeed, as was pointed out, if the Crown’s 
treaty-making power were impliedly excluded by 
section 2(1) of the Act of 1972, section 6 of the Act of 
1978 would not have been necessary.42 
 
By avoiding a serious engagement with the applicant’s arguments, the 
Divisional Court avoided an attempt to move the court ‘towards 
innovative and creative constitutional adjudication.’43 
                                                     
39 cf ibid 561 (Lloyd LJ): ‘it is in our view an exaggeration to describe it as the most 
important constitutional case for 300 years.’ 
40 The long title of European Communities (Amendment) Act 1993 is: ‘An Act to 
make provision consequential on the Treaty on European Union signed at Maastricht 
on 7th February 1992.’ 
41 Richard Rawlings, ‘Legal Politics: The United Kingdom and Ratification of the 
Treaty on European Union: Part 1’ [1994] Public Law 254, 259–60. 
42 Rees-Mogg (n 38) 567 (Lloyd LJ). Section 6(1) of the European Parliamentary 
Elections Act 1978 states that: ‘No treaty which provides for an increase in the 
powers of the European Parliament shall be ratified by the United Kingdom unless 
it has been approved by an Act of Parliament.’ 
43 Richard Rawlings, ‘Legal Politics: The United Kingdom and Ratification of the 
Treaty on European Union: Part 2’ [1994] Public Law 367, 383–84. 
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After losing in the Divisional Court, Lord Rees-Mogg’s 
counsel believed he had a stronger chance of winning in the higher 
courts,44 but the case was not appealed due to a lack of further financial 
backing. Yet Lord Pannick QC, who was also counsel for Mrs Miller, 
eventually succeeded in persuading the three judges in the Divisional 
Court and eight Justices of the Supreme Court. Crucial to that victory 
in Miller, it seems, was persuading the court that his main argument 
did not require any creativity, but was merely an orthodox application 
of established rules of constitutional law. How did he do that? 
 
 
IV. THE EFFECT OF EU LAW IN DOMESTIC LAW 
 
In his dissenting judgment in Miller, Lord Reed accurately 
summarised the effect of the 1972 Act when he wrote: 
 
[T]he effect which Parliament has given to EU law in 
our domestic law, under the 1972 Act, is inherently 
conditional on the application of the EU treaties to the 
UK, and therefore on the UK’s membership of the EU. 
The Act imposes no requirement, and manifests no 
intention, in respect of the UK’s membership of the 
EU. It does not, therefore, affect the Crown’s exercise 
of prerogative powers in respect of UK membership.45 
 
The majority Justices accepted the proposition in the first sentence, 
stating that section 2 of the 1972 Act makes directly effective EU law 
part of domestic law ‘so long as the United Kingdom is party to the 
EU Treaties.’46 Thus, it is accepted that the status of EU law in 
domestic law depends on two conditions: first, the UK’s continuing 
membership of the EU; secondly, the continuing statutory basis in the 
1972 Act. What the majority and minority disagree about is whether 
the 1972 Act has any implications for the UK’s membership of the 
EU, such that the prerogative is curtailed. 
The majority drew attention to the long title of the 1972 Act, 
which reads: ‘An Act to make provision in connection with the 
                                                     
44 David Pannick QC, Opinion (30 July 1993) paras 7, 14, and 15, cited in Rawlings 
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45 Miller (n 1) [177] (Lord Reed). 
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enlargement of the European Communities to include the United 
Kingdom …’. This, the majority said, ‘is not easy to reconcile with a 
prerogative power to achieve the opposite.’47 However, John Finnis 
has drawn attention to the contrast between the 1972 Act and the 
legislation to make provision for the new status of the UK’s former 
colonies, which each contain a long title of the form: ‘An Act to make 
provision for, and in connection with, the attainment by [the former 
colony] of fully responsible status within the Commonwealth.’48 The 
majority read the long title of the 1972 Act as if it made provision ‘for, 
and in connection with,’ the enlargement of the European 
Communities to include the UK. Yet Parliament studiously avoided 
that formulation, which it had frequently used, and continued to use, 
in other statutes. 
As the majority accepted, the way in which the 1972 Act gave 
effect to enforceable EU rights in domestic law entailed that those 
rights could vary ‘from time to time’.49 The question is whether they 
could vary as a result of the Crown’s prerogative power and, if so, 
whether the Crown has the power to reduce those rights to nil. It is true 
that, on the basis of existing constitutional principle set out in the 
previous section, the prerogative cannot be used to alter or revoke 
rights granted by Parliament. But the inherently conditional nature of 
the 1972 Act (which, as I said, was accepted by the majority) entails 
that the rights granted by Parliament are conditional on their continued 
availability under the EU Treaties. Again, Lord Reed put this point 
well when he wrote: 
 
If Parliament grants rights on the basis, express or 
implied, that they will expire in certain circumstances, 
then no further legislation is needed if those 
circumstances occur. If those circumstances comprise 
the UK’s withdrawal from a treaty, the rights are not 
revoked by the Crown’s exercise of prerogative 
                                                     
47 ibid [88]. See also Miller (n 3) [93] (Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd CJ, Sir Terence 
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powers: they are revoked by the operation of the Act of 
Parliament itself.50 
 
The majority’s response to this point is very weak.51 It ultimately 
depended not on statutory interpretation and Parliament’s intention, 
but on the court’s development a new constitutional principle, which 
we will come to later. 
Once the conditional effect of EU law in domestic law is 
properly understood, many related arguments fall away. For example, 
it was argued that withdrawal from the EU would deprive UK citizens 
of the right to vote in elections for the European Parliament, contained 
in section 8 of the European Parliamentary Elections Act 2002. But 
this right is also inherently conditional on the UK’s continued 
membership of the EU.52 Withdrawal from the EU would not deprive 
UK citizens of a right to vote that continues to exist under the 
(unrepealed) 2002 Act; rather, the statutory right would cease to exist 
because the circumstances on which its existence depended have 
ended. That does not entail that the Crown has a prerogative power to 
withdraw from the EU; however, it does entail that the use of that 
prerogative would not conflict with the rule derived from the Case of 
Proclamations, because it would not alter the law of the land. 
One possible objection to this analysis, mentioned briefly in 
the submissions of counsel for the claimants, is that it appears to be 
inconsistent with section 18 of the European Union Act 2011. On its 
face, section 18, which is commonly referred to as the ‘sovereignty 
clause’, merely declares what the courts had all along accepted—
namely, that the status of EU law in domestic law depends on a 
continuing statutory basis, which Parliament could (expressly) repeal 
at any time.53 But Lord Pannick QC and Dominic Chambers QC 
                                                     
50 Miller (n 1) [219] (Lord Reed). See also Lord Millett, ‘Prerogative Power and 
Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty’ (2016) 7 UK Supreme Court Yearbook 190, 191–
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51 ibid [77]. 
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argued that, in addition, this section affirms that only Parliament can 
remove the effect of EU law in domestic law. Section 18 states that: 
 
Directly applicable or directly effective EU law (that 
is, the rights, powers, liabilities, obligations, 
restrictions, remedies and procedures referred to in 
section 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972) 
falls to be recognised and available in law in the United 
Kingdom only by virtue of that Act or where it is 
required to be recognised and available in law by virtue 
of any other Act.54 
 
Counsel for the claimants stressed the word ‘only’ in this section, 
which they argued is a strong indication that Parliament intended that 
EU law’s status in domestic law should not also depend on whether 
the government exercises its prerogative power to withdraw.55 The 
essence of this argument is that, just as it was solely for Parliament to 
give EU law effect in domestic law, so it is solely for Parliament to 
remove that effect. But this interpretation of section 18 of the 2011 
Act—which, despite discussion during the hearing, was not 
considered in the Supreme Court’s judgments—is unsound because it 
overlooks the fact that the 1972 Act is itself inherently conditional on 
the UK’s continued membership, a point that the majority accepted. 
Once it is accepted that the 1972 Act gave effect to EU law on 
this conditional basis, does it follow that there is a prerogative power 
to withdraw from the EU? As we saw in the previous section, statutes 
that confer rights in a conditional way, and that appear to leave the 
prerogative unscathed, have occasionally been interpreted by the 
courts as fettering the prerogative. The Laker Airways case is a striking 
example of this: the exercise of a statutory licence right was, in 
practical terms, conditional on a designation under a treaty, but the 
court nonetheless held that the prerogative could not be used to 
undermine the statutory arrangements for granting licences. If 
reasoning like this applies to the effect of EU law in domestic law, it 
would defeat the argument that, as we saw Lloyd LJ claim in Rees-
Mogg, only express restrictions fetter the treaty-making prerogative in 
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relation to EU law.56 Parliament has explicitly placed extensive 
restrictions on the prerogative power in relation to EU law, most 
notably in the European Union Act 2011, but it has placed no express 
restriction on the executive’s exercise of the power to give notice 
under Article 50(2).57 Yet Parliament did not need to place an express 
restriction on this power, if the Laker Airways principle applies in this 
context—that is, if triggering Article 50 would undermine the effect 
given to enforceable EU rights in the 1972 Act. Let’s consider this 
argument more closely. 
 
 
V. THE FRUSTRATION OF PARLIAMENT 
 
The question can be put differently: did the 1972 Act impose an 
obligation on the government to ratify the accession treaty after the 
enactment of the 1972 Act? When this question was raised during the 
hearing, counsel for one of the claimants replied that ‘it would have 
been an abuse of power under Fire Brigades Union principles if there 
was no ratification.’58 Lord Carnwath, dissenting, dismissed the 
relevance of Fire Brigades Union, which he said is ‘about abuse, not 
absence, of power.’59 But the distinction between questions of scope 
(whether a prerogative power exists) and questions of abuse (whether 
an existing prerogative has been properly exercised) is not helpful in 
either case, which each concern the limits to the government’s 
authority. Fire Brigades Union is highly relevant to the questions 
raised in Miller, and it provides the most promising—though, in my 
view, still ultimately flawed—basis for the majority’s claim to have 
been applying existing constitutional law, namely, the principle that 
the prerogative cannot be used in a way that would frustrate an Act of 
Parliament. It is striking, therefore, that the majority barely discussed 
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this case and, as Lord Carnwath pointed out, did not ultimately rely on 
it. 
The Fire Brigades Union case involved the arrangements for 
the compensation of victims of violent crime. The Criminal Justice 
Act 1988 provided for a scheme that would give statutory force to the 
existing, non-statutory scheme for ex gratia compensation, usually 
regarded as having been established under the prerogative. Section 
171(1) stated that the relevant statutory provisions ‘shall come into 
force on such day as the Secretary of State may … appoint’.60 Years 
later, the government decided not to bring the provisions into force, 
and instead announced that it would use its prerogative to establish a 
new, less generous tariff scheme. The applicants challenged the 
government’s decision, on the basis that the 1988 Act had fettered the 
government’s prerogative. The House of Lords, by a three-to-two 
majority, interpreted section 171 as imposing ‘a clear duty to keep 
under consideration from time to time’ whether to bring the relevant 
provisions into force—a duty which was breached by the decision to 
introduce a different scheme by an exercise of the prerogative.61 Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson said: 
 
[I]t would be most surprising if, at the present day, 
prerogative powers could be validly exercised by the 
executive so as to frustrate the will of Parliament as 
expressed in a statute and, to an extent, to pre-empt the 
decision of Parliament whether or not to continue with 
the statutory scheme.62 
 
Lord Lloyd of Berwick, who we saw in Rees-Mogg had rejected the 
claim that the 1972 Act had fettered the treaty-making prerogative, 
held in Fire Brigades Union that section 171 should be construed ‘so 
as to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the legislative policy 
enshrined in sections 108 to 117, even though those sections are not in 
force.’63 The minister had discretion to decide when—but not 
whether—to bring the statutory scheme into force.64 
                                                     
60 The Criminal Justice Act 1988, s 171(1) (emphasis added). 
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You can see the suggested analogy between this case and 
Miller. The statutory scheme for criminal injuries compensation, set 
out in sections 108 to 117 of the 1988 Act, was not in force (and so 
did not confer any statutory rights), but nonetheless was held to fetter 
the prerogative power to alter the existing non-statutory scheme. 
Similarly, the argument runs, the 1972 Act, though not explicitly 
requiring the ratification of the accession treaty, fettered the Crown’s 
power in 1972 to decide whether to become, and now whether to 
remain, a member of the EU. As the Divisional Court put it in Miller, 
‘[t]he effect of the decision in the Fire Brigades Union case was that 
Parliament could not be taken to have legislated in vain.’65  
However, the Fire Brigades Union case also produced two 
powerful dissents. The dissenters rejected the majority’s view that 
section 171 imposed a duty that fettered the prerogative. But they also 
went further. Lord Keith of Kinkel described the majority’s decision 
as a ‘most improper’ and ‘unwarrantable intrusion by the court into 
the political field and a usurpation of the function of Parliament.’66 
Lord Mustill argued that, except when deciding the lawfulness of 
executive action, the court ‘has no competence to express any opinion 
on the relationship between the executive and Parliament.’67 These, 
and similar, remarks are unfortunate to the extent that they call into 
question the justiciability of the questions before the court, for there is 
little doubt that the scope of prerogative powers is a question for the 
court to resolve.68 But it was entirely appropriate for them to point out 
that the abuse of ministerial powers may be better remedied by 
parliamentary as opposed to judicial controls, that is, by the political 
rather than legal constitution.69 The dissenters in Miller were more 
measured in their criticism of the majority, but they similarly 
emphasised the executive’s accountability to Parliament, Lord Reed 
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noting that it ‘is important for courts to understand that the legalisation 
of political issues is not always constitutionally appropriate’.70 
In both cases, the dissenters’ concerns about judicial 
intervention in political issues were relevant—though perhaps not 
conclusive—only because they were justified in rejecting the 
majority’s conclusion that Parliament had fettered the prerogative. 
Gavin Phillipson has argued that the majority’s decision in Fire 
Brigades Union ‘was justified by a factor that is arguably not present 
in the Article 50 case: namely the presence of a straightforward 
statutory duty on the Minister’.71 But section 171, the commencement 
clause, conferred a broad discretion, not a duty. Until the minister 
exercised his wide discretionary power to bring them into force, the 
relevant provisions of the statutory scheme granted no enforceable 
rights to individuals. Moreover, since it was accepted that the minister 
could take financial considerations into account when considering 
when to bring the statutory provisions into force,72 it must surely 
follow that he could alter the existing non-statutory scheme on similar 
grounds.73 Even TRS Allan, a leading modern advocate of greater 
judicial intervention, has argued that the majority’s judgment in Fire 
Brigades Union was unjustified.74 The decision may well have served 
‘to supplement, not supplant, the political constitution’,75 but it is hard 
to avoid the conclusion that it was a supplement that Parliament did 
not need. 
In Miller, the majority’s conclusion, which was that the 1972 
Act ‘is inconsistent with the future exercise by ministers of any 
prerogative power to withdraw’, is similarly difficult to sustain.76 In 
making this criticism of the majority, it would be wrong to say that, 
by adding the Lisbon Treaty (and with it Article 50) to the list of 
Treaties in section 1(2) of the 1972 Act, the 2008 Act had changed the 
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statutory purpose of the 1972 Act, so that the earlier statute’s purpose 
became to make the UK a member of the EU, ‘unless the UK decides 
to leave’.77 The 1972 Act was conditional from the outset. As the 
Divisional Court in Miller acknowledged, when enacting the 1972 
Act, Parliament must be taken to have had in mind the possibility that 
the UK might seek to withdraw from the EU.78 The question, as the 
Divisional Court said, is ‘whether Parliament intended that this should 
be something that the Crown would be able to do through exercise of 
its prerogative powers without Parliament’s intervention.’79 
On this question, notwithstanding the majority’s conclusion, 
Parliament expressed no view one way or another, in 1972 or at any 
other time. As Lord Reed explains in his dissenting judgment, at the 
time of the passage of the 1972 Act it was foreseeable that the 
accession treaty might not have been ratified, and yet Parliament 
remained silent on whether ratification was required.80 The 1972 Act 
is also consistent with a prerogative power to withdraw. But that is not 
to say that the court could not develop the common law to impose a 
constraint on the prerogative—which is in effect what the Supreme 
Court did. 
 
 
VI. A MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
 
For the majority, the status of EU law as a source of domestic law 
entailed that the treaty-making prerogative ‘cannot be exercised in 
relation to the EU Treaties’, regardless of the silence in the 1972 Act: 
‘rather than the Secretary of State being able to rely on the absence in 
the 1972 Act of any exclusion of the prerogative power to withdraw 
from the EU Treaties, the proper analysis is that, unless that Act 
positively created such a power in relation to those Treaties, it does 
not exist.’81 Thus, in light of the foregoing, the majority’s conclusion 
can be restated as follows: the prerogative cannot be used to remove a 
source of rights to which an Act of Parliament has given effect, even 
                                                     
77 Craig (n 9) 1061–62; Phillipson (n 12) 1084. 
78 Miller (n 3) [56] (Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd CJ, Sir Terence Etherton MR, and 
Sales LJ). 
79 ibid. 
80 Miller (n 1) [194] (Lord Reed). 
81 ibid [86]. 
 
 
 
 
Reflections on Miller 22 
if the removal of that source is consistent with that Act of Parliament. 
Here is the main reason for this conclusion: 
 
We cannot accept that a major change to UK 
constitutional arrangements can be achieved by 
ministers alone; it must be effected in the only way that 
the UK constitution recognises, namely by 
Parliamentary legislation. This conclusion appears to 
us to follow from the ordinary application of basic 
concepts of constitutional law.82  
 
No authority was offered in support of this proposition, and apart from 
their discussion of the principle of legality, which we will see is 
contestable in this context, the majority provided no justification for 
curtailing the prerogative power in this way. As Lord Carnwath said 
in dissent, the court was ‘shown no authority to support a rule as so 
stated, nor any principled basis for the court to invent it.’83 
One aspect of the majority’s claim ought to be uncontroversial: 
withdrawing from the EU will be a major constitutional change. Yet 
this point was rejected by Lord Reed.84 His Lordship objected to the 
majority’s description of the 1972 Act as having ‘a constitutional 
character’ due to its creation of ‘an entirely new, independent and 
overriding source of domestic law’.85 It is true, as the majority and the 
minority acknowledged, that EU law is not an ultimate source of law, 
because its validity as a source of domestic law depends on a different 
source of law, namely an Act of Parliament.86 In that sense—and only 
that sense—it is not an ‘independent’ source of law as the majority 
described it, though of course it is an independent source in the 
sense—misleadingly described by the majority as ‘a more 
fundamental sense’ and ‘a more realistic sense’ (I would rather say 
merely a different sense)—that it is the EU institutions, not 
Parliament, that make and change EU law.87 
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But Lord Reed went further and argued that recognition of the 
validity of EU law in domestic law ‘does not alter any fundamental 
principle of our constitution.’88 The majority was right to reject this 
objection. Indeed, withdrawal from the EU will be a more fundamental 
change in our constitution than even the majority acknowledged. The 
majority rejected the claim that there had been any change to ‘the so-
called fundamental rule of recognition’.89 The ‘rule of recognition’ 
was the term used by HLA Hart, the pre-eminent legal philosopher of 
the twentieth century, in his ground-breaking account of a legal 
system’s ultimate criteria of legal validity.90 The UK’s rule of 
recognition includes the legal supremacy of Acts of Parliament (or 
parliamentary sovereignty): what the Queen in Parliament enacts is 
law. While EU law owes its validity as a source of domestic law to an 
Act of Parliament, the parliamentary and judicial recognition of the 
doctrine of the primacy of EU law has changed the ultimate criteria of 
legal validity.91 This fundamental constitutional change was not made 
by Parliament on its own, when it enacted section 2(4) of the 1972 Act. 
The rule of recognition is determined by the acceptance of law-
applying officials, especially judges.92 But the constitutional change 
brought about by this acceptance among officials will inevitably be 
reversed following either the express repeal of the 1972 Act or the 
withdrawal of the UK from the EU. 
Thus, we can accept the majority’s argument that there is a 
difference—perhaps even what they called a ‘vital difference’—
between, on the one hand, changing domestic law by contributing to 
changes in EU law and, on the other, withdrawing from the EU, 
thereby removing EU law as an overriding source of domestic law: the 
latter would result in ‘a fundamental change in the constitutional 
arrangements of the United Kingdom.’93 Put differently, withdrawal 
from the EU will be a change that is ‘different not just in degree but in 
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kind from the abrogation of particular rights, duties or rules derived 
from EU law.’94 
But the nature of this constitutional change does not by itself 
justify the majority’s conclusion that, while there is a prerogative 
power to contribute to the EU law-making process, there is no 
prerogative power to leave the EU.95 It remains the case that the effect 
given to EU law as a source of domestic law is ‘inherently contingent 
on the UK’s continued membership of the EU’, and there is no 
statutory limit on the use of the prerogative to withdraw.96 The 
majority, relying on the Simms principle of legality, argued that the 
court will require statutory authorisation by express language, or 
necessary implication, before it will infer that ministers have a ‘far-
reaching and anomalous right to use a treaty-making power to remove 
an important source of domestic law and important domestic rights.’97 
As the 1972 Act and later statutes were silent on that power, it did not 
exist. 
Strikingly, Lord Reed relied on the very same kind of 
reasoning to reach exactly the opposite conclusion. Starting from the 
premise that ‘it is a basic principle of our constitution that the conduct 
of foreign affairs, including the ratification of treaties, falls within the 
prerogative powers of the Crown’, Lord Reed argued that this 
principle ‘is so fundamental that it can only be overridden by express 
provision or necessary implication.’98 As the 1972 Act and later 
statutes were silent on the prerogative power to withdraw, it continued 
to exist. 
Both the majority and the minority failed to see that the silence 
of the 1972 Act calls for creative constitutional adjudication, in which 
the question is whether the common law should be developed to 
recognise a constraint on the prerogative in this context. Resisting this 
type of adjudication, Gavin Phillipson warned that the judges in Miller 
should intervene only if ‘they are fairly certain that the law requires 
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them to’.99 But, as noted at the outset of this article, judges have the 
power to develop the law where it is silent or indeterminate, making 
both the majority and the minority’s decisions constitutionally 
permissible.100 In such circumstances, not intervening may be 
considered to be just as ‘activist’, or creative, as intervening.101 We 
can accept the majority’s decision only if we can explain why it would 
be morally or politically illegitimate for the executive to have the 
power to withdraw from the EU without parliamentary authorisation.  
 
 
VII. CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE DECISIONS 
 
Opening the door to the question of the legitimacy of a prerogative 
power to trigger Article 50, we are faced with a broad range of 
considerations. There are considerations that go to the question of 
whether the decision can legitimately be made by the executive or only 
by Parliament. And then there are considerations that go to the 
question of whether it is right for the court to intervene to make 
parliamentary authorisation a legal requirement. 
Once the question is posed, ‘Who should make the decision to 
withdraw from the EU?’, the answer may seem obvious: Parliament 
should decide, and maybe the people in a referendum, but certainly 
not the executive. On this simple view, the executive cannot have the 
legitimate authority to make this decision, because if it did then it 
would have been open to the executive, at any time on or after 2 
January 1972, to withdraw from the EU Treaties without 
parliamentary authorisation, even if there had been no referendum or 
if a referendum had resulted in a vote to remain. The majority 
described these as ‘implausible propositions’, and used them to 
highlight the ‘improbability of the Secretary of State’s case’.102 
This simple view is too simplistic. The improbability is that the 
executive would decide to withdraw in the absence of a referendum, 
or in the face of a vote to remain, but this improbability is no reason 
                                                     
99 cf Phillipson (n 12) 1082 (emphasis in original). 
100 See Michael Foley, The Silence of Constitutions: Gaps, ‘Abeyances’ and Political 
Temperament in the Maintenance of Government (Routledge 1989); Stephen Sedley, 
‘The Sound of Silence: Constitutional Law without a Constitution’ (1994) 110 Law 
Quarterly Review 270. 289–91. 
101 Sedley (n 100) 291. 
102 Miller (n 1) [91]. 
 
 
 
 
Reflections on Miller 26 
for denying the existence of that power. If, implausibly, the executive 
had attempted to use its power in this way, it would have been 
accountable to the courts through judicial review and to Parliament 
through the convention of ministerial responsibility. The majority was 
highly dismissive of both forms of accountability: they described the 
availability of judicial review as ‘rather a bold suggestion’ given the 
traditional view that ‘prerogative treaty-making powers are not subject 
to judicial review’; and they described the relevance of the executive’s 
accountability to Parliament as ‘a potentially controversial argument 
constitutionally’, because it ‘would justify all sorts of powers being 
accorded to the executive’.103 Both objections are well wide of the 
mark. 
The majority considered themselves able to intervene in Miller 
because they were concerned with the existence, or scope, of the 
prerogative power, rather than its exercise. The latter is no longer 
considered immune from judicial review, though the courts are often 
reluctant to intervene, especially in the exercise of the treaty-making 
prerogative.104 During the hearing, Lord Reed suggested that, if the 
question is about the exercise, rather than the existence, of the 
prerogative—that is, about whether the executive has abused its 
power, rather than exceeded it—then the referendum result would 
become a relevant consideration.105 Lord Pannick QC agreed: ‘Once 
we are into questions of abuse … the court will plainly give the 
broadest of discretion, and that is not our case.’106 
But, as I suggested earlier, the distinction between questions 
of abuse and excess of power is to a large extent unhelpful, especially 
when, as in this case, statute and precedent are indeterminate. In such 
circumstances, the court must demarcate the scope of the executive’s 
legitimate authority, which requires an assessment of the justification 
of executive authority and the same considerations that are involved 
in deciding whether the court should intervene to remedy an abuse of 
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power. In the context of the Miller case, Timothy Endicott has 
provided a good analysis of the justification of executive authority, 
and the need for, as Blackstone put it, ‘unity, strength and dispatch’ in 
the executive function.107 A variety of considerations are relevant, 
including the referendum result and the executive’s accountability to 
Parliament.108 
The referendum result may be thought to be especially 
relevant, and it is not just the tabloid journalists quoted earlier who 
take this view.109 The referendum itself is not a source of law and 
cannot be legally binding unless an Act of Parliament makes it legally 
binding. The EU Referendum Act 2015, unlike other legislation 
establishing referendums,110 imposed no duty on the government to 
implement the result. But the court could have held that the 
referendum was a relevant consideration, which, in effect, gave the 
government the legitimate authority to decide to trigger Article 50.111 
Yet there is much disagreement about the respective merits of 
direct democracy and representative democracy. The primacy of the 
latter in the traditional understanding of the UK constitution led the 
House of Lords Constitution Committee to conclude that it would be 
‘constitutionally inappropriate’ for the executive to act on an advisory 
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referendum without explicit parliamentary approval.112 Although the 
Constitution Committee said nothing to justify (and much to 
contradict) its conclusion that it would be constitutionally 
inappropriate,113 there is certainly a strong argument for the 
conclusion that, in view of the importance—indeed, the constitutional 
importance—of withdrawing from the EU, in a representative 
democracy this decision ought to be made by Parliament. 
These of course do not exhaust the considerations relevant to 
the question whether the executive has legitimate authority to trigger 
Article 50, but they are illustrative. My point here is that, whether you 
agree with the majority or the minority in Miller, the decision must be 
justified on the basis of considerations such as these. It cannot be 
justified by constitutional requirements, for each decision was 
constitutionally permissible until the majority made parliamentary 
authorisation a requirement. 
 
 
VIII. LAW, CONVENTION, AND DEVOLUTION 
 
If the UK’s constitution is as flexible as this suggests, was it also open 
to the Supreme Court to decide whether the consent of the Scottish 
Parliament, the Welsh Assembly, and the Northern Ireland Assembly 
is required before Article 50 is triggered? The requirement to seek the 
consent of these devolved legislatures when legislation affects 
devolved matters—a requirement known as the ‘Sewel convention’—
has always been understood to be a ‘political restriction’, 
unenforceable by a court.114 But the Lord Advocate on behalf of the 
Scottish Government, the Counsel General for Wales, and the 
Attorney General for Northern Ireland, argued that the convention 
should now be interpreted and applied by the court. If accepted, this 
argument would undoubtedly have been by far the most significant 
and far-reaching part of the case. But the Supreme Court 
unanimously—and, in my view, rightly—rejected the argument.115 
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Constitutional conventions are an important part of any 
constitution, but they are especially important in the United Kingdom. 
They are rules of the constitution that are often defined in contrast with 
law: as AV Dicey described them, they ‘are not in reality law at all 
since they are not enforced by the Courts’.116 Dicey believed that all 
the conventions of the constitution have ‘one ultimate object’, which 
is to ensure that Parliament and the Crown ‘give effect to the will of 
that power which … is the true political sovereign of the state—the 
majority of the electors’.117 That aim may explain why officials 
adhere, or should adhere, to some of the constitutional conventions, 
but in any case the motivations behind conventions do not determine 
their existence and content.  
The existence and content of conventional rules depend on two 
factors: first, there must be a regularity of behaviour, and secondly, 
the participants must regard their behaviour as obligatory, and not 
merely as a habit.118 To the extent that the constitution consists of 
conventions, therefore, the constitution is ‘what happens’, as John 
Griffith put it,119 for constitutional conventions are determined by 
what the officials (broadly defined to include ministers, civil servants, 
parliamentarians, and so forth) actually do, backed by a consensus that 
what they do is also what they ought to do. But because conventional 
rules depend on a common practice and acceptance among officials, 
they break down and become indeterminate when there is 
disagreement. At that stage, there is really no rule at all, and we are 
left with political claims about what ought to happen.120 
During the second reading debate of the Scotland Bill in 1998, 
Lord Sewel, a government minister, told Parliament that ‘we would 
expect a convention to be established that Westminster would not 
normally legislate with regard to devolved matters in Scotland without 
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the consent of the Scottish Parliament.’121 This reassurance was 
necessary because section 28(7) of the Scotland Act 1998 provides 
that the legal supremacy of Acts of the UK Parliament is unaffected 
by devolution. Consistently with this legal supremacy, Lord Sewel’s 
statement, which was later reflected in a Memorandum of 
Understanding, explained what ought to happen ‘normally’.122 Of 
course, a statement or a Memorandum of Understanding does not 
make a convention. But there is strong evidence that a convention to 
this effect has developed, not only for legislation on devolved matters, 
but also for legislation that alters the competence of the devolved 
institutions, at least in Scotland and Wales.  
The disagreement about whether the consent of the devolved 
legislatures is necessary before triggering Article 50 is evidence that 
the convention is indeterminate on that question. What we have are 
competing political claims, but no conventional rule that can settle the 
matter. There is not only a lack of general acceptance on this point, 
but also a lack of settled practice. Importantly, as the Supreme Court 
noted in the Miller case, ‘legislation which implements changes to the 
competences of EU institutions and thereby affects devolved 
competencies … has not been the subject of legislative consent 
motions in any devolved legislature.’123 
Given these features of constitutional conventions in general, 
and the Sewel convention in particular, the Supreme Court in Miller 
was therefore right to maintain the orthodox position on their non-
justiciability: ‘Judges,’ they said, ‘are neither the parents nor the 
guardians of political conventions; they are merely observers.’124 
While there have been instances when the courts have interpreted 
constitutional conventions,125 these instances have always been when 
the law requires the courts to take into account non-legal 
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considerations such as constitutional conventions,126 which have never 
been directly legally enforceable.127 
Two objections to the Supreme Court’s judgment on this point 
have been raised, however. First, Article 50(1), you will recall, states 
that the decision to withdraw from the EU must be ‘in accordance with 
the Member State’s own constitutional requirements’. It was argued 
that this provision required the court to determine what all the 
constitutional requirements are, including the conventional ones. This 
argument was clearly flawed, so much so that the Supreme Court did 
not even discuss it. Article 50(1) did not confer jurisdiction on the 
courts to assume the role of guardians of the whole constitution, 
including its political conventions. To the extent that conventions are 
political requirements, they are requirements enforced by the officials 
whose behaviour determines their content. 
Secondly, in 2016 the Scotland Act 1998 was amended to 
include a new section 28(8), which states that ‘it is recognised that the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom will not normally legislate with 
regard to devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish 
Parliament.’ It was argued that this legislative recognition of the Sewel 
convention turned it into a legal rule that the courts could interpret. 
The main problem with this argument, however, is that the subsection 
is clearly declaratory of an existing practice (‘it is recognised’), and 
explicitly incorporates the vagueness of Lord Sewel’s statement and 
the Memorandum of Understanding (‘will not normally’). As the 
Supreme Court pointed out, this language—in the majority’s words, 
‘recognising the convention for what it is, namely a political 
convention’—is hardly indicative of a legislative intention to turn the 
convention into a legal rule justiciable by the courts.128 Legislation that 
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does not create a legal rule may seem odd, but it is more common than 
you might think.129 
The Supreme Court went on to say, in a remark that called for 
(but did not receive) further explanation, that ‘the purpose of the 
legislative recognition of the convention was to entrench it as a 
convention.’130 Aside from acknowledging a pre-existing convention, 
the purpose of the legal recognition is unclear. But its effect is clear 
enough: it changed nothing. The convention remains just what it was 
before its recognition in statute, because the Sewel convention’s non-
justiciability ‘follows from the nature of its content’.131 Its content, as 
discussed above, is determined by the behaviour of the officials who 
are subject to the rule, and where there is disagreement, only political 
argument can settle what should happen. 
The legal supremacy of Acts of Parliament provides a further 
reason for the court to avoid interpreting, let alone enforcing, the 
Sewel convention. We must emphasise that the submissions from the 
devolved institutions did not challenge the UK Parliament’s legislative 
supremacy.132 They were not questioning the validity of any statute 
authorising the triggering of Article 50 without the consent of the 
devolved legislatures. Yet they were asking the court to rule that the 
constitutional requirements for the purposes of Article 50(1) include 
the legislative consent of the devolved institutions. The effect of such 
a ruling, despite their claims to the contrary, would have been 
inconsistent with Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689, which prohibits 
courts from questioning parliamentary proceedings.133 Moreover, if 
the court had held that the Sewel convention is a constitutional 
requirement, the effect of that ruling would have been purely political, 
given the continuing commitment to the legislative supremacy of the 
UK parliament, a constitutional requirement that overrides the lack of 
devolved consent. That provides yet another reason why the Supreme 
Court was right not to be drawn into the politics of devolution. 
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There is an irony in seeking to use the Sewel convention as an 
obstacle to a process—the UK’s withdrawal from the EU—that will, 
as the majority in Miller noted, ‘enhance the devolved competence’.134 
This use of the Sewel convention is in one respect a reversal of another 
attempt to constrain the authority of the Crown-in-Parliament in order 
to protect Scots law. Article XVIII of the Acts of Union of 1706 and 
1707, part of which was cited in support of the majority’s conclusion 
that an Act of Parliament was legally required for the UK to withdraw 
from the EU,135 was used in the 1970s—unsuccessfully—to challenge 
the UK’s accession to the EEC and the validity of the 1972 Act.136 
Article XVIII states that ‘no alteration be made in Laws which concern 
private Right except for evident utility of the subjects within 
Scotland.’ This, like the Sewel convention, has the purpose of 
protecting Scotland’s distinct legal identity. But the principles beneath 
these two provisions—that changes to Scots law should be for the 
‘evident utility’ of subjects in Scotland and, if on a devolved matter or 
altering the competence of the devolved legislature, should be made 
with the Scottish Parliament’s consent—could each be invoked to 
challenge EU laws as much as UK laws. Yet, as already mentioned, 
the Sewel convention has not been used in that way.137 In so far as 
withdrawal from the EU will remove rights that are within the 
competence of the Scottish Parliament, it will be open to the Scottish 
Parliament to enact new rights, replicating EU rights if it wishes. The 
Scottish Parliament will have more control over those matters than it 
currently does. If people want to preserve and develop Scots law’s 
distinctiveness from English law, we might expect them similarly to 
want to preserve and develop its distinctiveness from the law of the 
EU.138 
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Of course, the real reason behind the demand for obstacles to 
the UK’s withdrawal from the EU is not that it is required by the Sewel 
convention, but that a majority of people in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland who voted in the referendum on 23 June 2016 voted for the 
UK to remain in the EU. But that consideration, like the argument 
about the Sewel convention, is legally (and, in my view, morally) 
irrelevant to the authority of the UK Parliament to legislate for 
withdrawal. Faced with claims about the legal supremacy of 
Parliament, advocates of Scottish exceptionalism usually wheel out 
Lord Cooper’s eccentric and obiter remarks in MacCormick v Lord 
Advocate.139 Although he was not convinced that the court had 
jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of an Act of Parliament 
(an important qualification!), Lord Cooper remarked that ‘[t]he 
principle of the unlimited sovereignty of Parliament is a distinctively 
English principle which has no counterpart in Scottish constitutional 
law.’140 In Miller, the Lord Advocate cited these remarks in support of 
his argument, despite his claim not to be challenging the UK 
Parliament’s legislative supremacy.141  
Arguments from popular sovereignty, as Dicey acknowledged, 
may inform the development of non-legal, political constraints on the 
UK Parliament.142 These are especially contested when the question is 
who counts as ‘the people’ in the appeal to popular sovereignty. But 
these arguments, while contributing to a fiercely contested and 
unsettled constitutional future, have not yet changed the rule of 
recognition. Of course, the rule of recognition can change—as we saw 
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it did following the UK’s acceptance of the doctrine of EU law 
supremacy—but it changes only when there is a change in the practice 
of those who use the rule of recognition and tacitly presuppose its 
existence. Nothing in the devolution arrangements has had that effect. 
For all these reasons, the Supreme Court was right to conclude 
that the Sewel convention is not a legal rule justiciable by the court. 
More than most, ours is a flexible constitution, and the judges are not 
its guardians. Judges are the guardians of the rule of law, and it is in 
that capacity that they determined whether Her Majesty’s Government 
had a prerogative power to trigger Article 50. The fact that, as I have 
argued, the law was indeterminate on that question, and that the court 
was therefore required to turn to extra-legal considerations, does not 
entail that the court has jurisdiction to adjudicate on non-legal rules 
generally. 
 
 
IX. PARLIAMENT AND THE JUDICIARY 
 
The myth of Miller is that the majority defended established 
constitutional principles, safeguarding the balance of power between 
the executive and the sovereign Parliament.143 This is a myth because 
the balance of power was not in doubt: there was no challenge to 
Parliament’s legislative supremacy.144 There is no doubt that, as in the 
Fire Brigades Union case, Parliament could have asserted its authority 
itself. It was open to Parliament, at any time before or after the 
referendum on 23 June 2016, to enact a statute requiring the 
government to seek parliamentary authorisation before triggering 
Article 50. Parliament did not need the judiciary to come to its 
defence. 
In my view, it was right that Parliament should make this 
decision. A decision as momentous as the decision to withdraw from 
the EU should be made not by the government in the exercise of its 
royal prerogative, nor by the voters in a referendum, but by Parliament 
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in the fulfilment of its role as the UK’s representative and deliberative 
institution. Indeed, I think there was a very strong argument for MPs 
to vote against triggering Article 50, despite the referendum result. 
During the debate on the European Union (Notification of 
Withdrawal) Bill, Kenneth Clarke MP, paraphrasing Edmund Burke, 
said, ‘If I no longer give you the benefit of my judgment and simply 
follow your orders, I am not serving you; I am betraying you.’145 There 
is much in this argument, though, not surprisingly, it was not a popular 
one among MPs. 
But was it right for the Supreme Court to make parliamentary 
authorisation a legal requirement? The creative element of 
constitutional adjudication in this case may lead some to suspect that 
a democratic objection may be relevant. For democratic objections can 
be levelled not only against rights-based constitutional review, but 
also against structural constitutional review.146 However, even if such 
objections are sound, this kind of structural constitutional adjudication 
is less significant in a system such as ours that continues to recognise 
the legal supremacy of Acts of Parliament—in contrast with a federal 
system—because it is always open to Parliament to legislate.  
The arguments for and against the court’s intervention in 
Miller were more finely balanced than both sides admit. But one 
practical argument is worth highlighting. Although it was always open 
to Parliament to make its voice heard and legislate, MPs, fearful of 
their constituents’ reactions, were reluctant to insist that parliamentary 
authorisation was necessary before the government could start the 
process of withdrawing. In other words, the parliamentary will to 
legislate in the face of the referendum result was lacking. Whatever 
your view on the merits of the Miller judgment, we should regret the 
image of a Parliament that is unwilling to assert its authority without 
the impetus of the judiciary. 
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